

**When the Nile is Contested:
A Dynamics of Water Conflicts in the Middle East and the Challenge of Solutions**

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Abstract

This paper aims to analyse the hydropolitical conflict on the Nile River as a form of struggle for natural water resources by the countries involved in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Ethiopia. The Nile River has strategic value in both political and economic aspects. Many agreements have been made to avoid hydropolitical conflicts on the Nile River both bilaterally and multilaterally, although some have created new problems. The existence of factors that can affect the amount of water in the Nile, population growth, climate change, and the construction of the GERD dam by Ethiopia are new challenges for neighbouring countries regarding the future of water in the Nile and solutions to deal with it. This research uses qualitative methods with data collection through documentation studies, archival studies and internet-based studies. The concepts of conflict and conflict resolution were used as a theoretical framework to unravel the problem. The author found that hydropolitical conflict caused by the struggle over the Nile River is one of the prominent forms of conflict that has the potential to threaten security and peace in the region. Cooperation and the drafting of agreements that are more inclusive and represent the interests of the disputing parties are needed.

Keywords: *Water, Nile, Hydropolitics, Conflict Resolution, peace.*

A. Introduction

Water is one of the most important things in life. Every human being needs water for their survival. Even other entities such as microorganisms also need water for their lives. Unlike oil, water circulates in the form of the water cycle. This cycle occurs continuously so that the existence of water in the world will never decrease. The question is why is there still water scarcity in some parts of the world? The earth's surface is 70% water. However, only 0.5% of it can be used directly to fulfil human needs. The rest cannot be directly accessed and used because it requires a treatment process first. 97% is salty water that can only be used after going through the desalination process first. And finally, there is 2.5% of water in the form of glaciers or groundwater¹.

¹ Taikan Oki & Shinjiro Kanae. (2006) 'Global Hydrological Cycles and World Water Resources', *Science*, 313(5790), pp. 1068–1072. Available at: <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1128845>.

Clean water resources are limited and unevenly distributed around the world. Water resources can be a reason for conflict and co-operation. There are three main relationships between conflict and water, including (1) Access to adequate water supply. Conflicts over water are most likely to involve access to water of adequate quantity and quality. What this means is that, while water supplies are not strictly limited, the allocation and quality of water also play an important role. The allocation of water among different users and uses can be highly contested. If the quality of water declines, it can adversely affect health and create a scarcity of clean water, which can lead to conflicts over water as well. Water supply for irrigated areas that declines in quality or quantity can also destabilise receiving cities or neighbouring countries. Next, (2) Water's relationship with livelihoods and civil conflict.

Water is a resource for agriculture, which is traditionally the largest source of livelihood. If agriculture as a livelihood is no longer available, then people will turn to other ways to make a living, sometimes by illicit means, then migration caused by several things such as lack of water, drought, infrastructure development, and pollution can create tensions between local communities and migrants especially in terms of scarce resources. Because of the loss of livelihoods, it can lead to poverty, which has been identified as a common denominator of conflict, particularly in civil wars in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America over the past decade². In addition, (3) Water management and conflict. Water shortage in most cases is not a cause of conflict. Inadequate ways of managing the resource are one of the causes of conflict. Water management fails for several reasons such as lack of adequate water management institutions, lack of administrative capacity and lack of transparency.

The increasing population in the Middle East, the Middle East's lack of water resources to meet its increasing water demand, and the misuse of available water resources by countries in the Middle East as well as the use of water by some countries beyond their needs will make the Middle East experience a worse water crisis and will lead to military tensions³. One of the water conflicts in the Middle East is over the Nile River. Passing through 11 countries, the Nile is an important source of life support. Conflicts often occur in each country over water resources in the Nile River and cooperation is carried out to avoid deeper conflicts. In a

² L Ohlsson. (2000) 'Water conflicts and social resource scarcity', *Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Part B: Hydrology, Oceans and Atmosphere*, 25(3), pp. 213–220. doi: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1464-1909\(00\)00006-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1464-1909(00)00006-X).

³ Ghazi Ismail Rababa'a. (2012) 'Water Conflict in the Middle East', *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 2(21), pp. 13–27. Available at: http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_21_November_2012/2.pdf.

previous study, Charles M. Kang'ethe in *Conflicts of Shared Resources: A Case Study of the River Nile* explains the conflict over the Nile River water resources that are located and divided into several countries and what are the interests of these countries in the Nile River that can trigger conflict.

This paper describes the dynamics of conflicts over the Nile River, the interests of the countries involved, the conflicts that occur and how conflict resolution is carried out as well as the emergence of new problems such as GERD and climate change which are likely to become new major problems for surrounding countries and require further and intense cooperation.

B. Discussion

The Nile River flows through 11 countries, namely Tanzania, Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan, Kenya, and Egypt. The flow and outflow of water along the mainstream of the Nile depends on many factors such as weather, diversion, evaporation and evapotranspiration, and groundwater flow. The Nile is the longest river in the world with a length of 6,853 km. there are 2 main tributaries, the White Nile and the Blue Nile. What are the geographical and political aspects of the Nile Basin that might cause water conflicts? Firstly, the Nile Basin passes through 1/10 of the African continent and is the second largest river in the world with the lowest specific discharge in comparison to other large rivers. Second, there is a big difference between a riparian country that contributes to all the water in the Nile but uses almost none of it like Ethiopia and a country that does not contribute to the water in the Nile but uses almost all of it like Egypt. Thirdly, the Nile has become strategically positioned both economically and politically, for the rapid population growth and agricultural economic needs of the countries that have turned the Nile's water into a much-needed resource.

1. Dynamics of the Nile Conflict in the Era of British Colonialism

The hydro-politics of the Nile are largely based on the colonial events that took place there. After the British took control of Egypt in 1882, they realised that the Nile was important for them to secure their position in Egypt. In fact, initially the British were more interested in the Suez Canal than the Nile. Further British 'projects' began in Uganda in 1894 and Sudan in 1896-1898 to expand control of the Nile as a resource. However, Britain was still unable to acquire Ethiopia, where 80% of the water resources came from.

So, in 1902 Britain made an agreement with Ethiopia to discuss any Blue Nile water projects, especially in Lake Tana with the aim that existing water sources would not be disturbed. Later, the British Government signed treaties related to the Nile River in which Egypt got a larger share than other riparian countries. By controlling Egypt, Britain would have the opportunity to trade more favourably with India, its richest colony. As for France, the canal offered faster access to their most profitable colony. European colonialism in Africa in the 1880s created many new states in the Nile Basin, or the region drained by the Nile River, which then fought over natural resources.

In the late 19th century, the main goal of European colonialism was to control the Nile River because Egypt was so dependent on it. By controlling the Nile, they would be able to hold Egypt as the key to their wealth in Asia. The French-British competition for control of the Nile Basin culminated in 1898 at Fashoda. The French had the idea of building a dam on the White Nile, so as to undermine British influence further downstream and establish east-west control of the continent but it was recognised by the British so the French plan failed. Then in 1899 the two colonial powers reached an agreement whereby France got the Congo River border and the British got the White Nile border.

2. Dynamics of the Nile Conflict in the Post-British Colonial Era

After achieving independence in 1922, Egypt negotiated the 1929 Nile Waters Treaty with the British colony of East Africa. This treaty established Egypt's rights to 48 billion cubic metres of water flow, all dry season waters, and a veto over upstream water management projects; the newly independent Sudan (1956) was granted rights to 4 billion cubic metres of water. Meanwhile, the King of Ethiopia did not take part in the treaty because no one understood how much Nile water actually came from Ethiopia. The 1959 Nile Waters Treaty between Egypt and Sudan was finalised before the basin countries achieved independence, namely Tanzania (1961), Uganda (1962), Rwanda (1962), Burundi (1962), and Kenya (1963). The 1959 treaty allocated Egypt 55.5 billion cubic metres of water while Sudan was allowed 18.5 billion cubic metres of water. These 79 billion cubic metres represented 99% of the calculated average annual river flow. The treaty however came under fire from the states stating that the former colonies had no obligation to abide by treaties signed for them by Great Britain.

The 1929 treaty between Egypt and Britain, then acting on behalf of Sudan, had as its main objective to secure the Nile for Egypt by limiting the rights of Sudan and denying the rights of other riparian states⁴. The treaty resulted from political negotiations between Egypt and Britain in the 1920s, particularly the report of the Nile Waters Commission in 1925 which was attached to the treaty as an integral part of it⁵. Under the treaty Sudan has the right to utilise the Nile as long as it does not interfere with Egypt's rights to the Nile, while for Egypt itself, it has the right to monitor the flow of water in the upstream Nile countries, the right to undertake any project on the Nile without the consent of the other riparian countries, and also the right to veto the construction of works that would negatively affect Egypt's interest in the Nile. Egypt has the right to 48 billion cubic metres per year of the Nile while Sudan only gets 4 billion cubic metres per year. The treaty is binding on the countries under British rule, on the other hand it has no power to bind Ethiopia to it⁶.

After Sudan achieved independence in 1956, the Government of Sudan refused to continue the validity of the 1929 Nile Water Treaty. The main argument for Sudan's refusal was the skewed allocation and construction of the Aswan High Dam in Southern Egypt⁷. The new Sudanese government demanded a larger share of the Nile. This new Sudanese stance threatened the Egyptian Government's plans to build a high dam in Southern Egypt. Egypt therefore deployed troops to the Sudanese border as a threat. Sudan nevertheless persisted in demanding a larger share of the Nile waters. Sudan refused to abide by the 1929 treaty and demanded to renegotiate the division of the Nile waters. Egypt then

⁴ Hanafi A. Radwan. (2014) *Nile Basin cooperation and conflict*, www.researchgate.net. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296488649_Nile_Basin_cooperation_and_conflict (Accessed: 13 April 2024).

⁵ Okoth-Owiro, Arthur. (2004) *The Nile treaty: State succession and international treaty commitments: a case study of the Nile water treaties*. Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

⁶ Patricia Kameri-mbote. (2005) *From Conflict To Cooperation In The Management of Transboundary Waters: The Nile Experience*. Washington DC. Available at: www.ielrc.org/content/a0509.pdf.

⁷ Andreas Holm Røsberg. (2014) *Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile Understanding Egypt's Refusal to Renegotiate the 1929 and 1959 Agreements Concerning Rights and Allocations of the Nile*. University of Oslo. Available at: https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/40296/Rsberg_Master.pdf.

renegotiated the division of the Nile waters with Sudan, but not with Ethiopia or other upstream countries⁸.

The 1959 treaty was signed by Egypt and Sudan, which had become independent from the British. It was a modification of the 1929 treaty whereby Egypt and Sudan's share of the Nile was increased, with Egypt getting 55.5 billion cubic metres per year and Sudan getting 18.5 billion cubic metres per year. The two countries left only about 10 billion cubic metres unallocated for seepage and evaporation. In addition, the treaty stipulates that any increase in the annual water flow of the Nile will be shared equally between the two countries. Both the 1929 treaty and the 1959 treaty are bilateral. The 1929 treaty was between Egypt and Britain while the 1959 treaty was between Egypt and Sudan. They completely ignored the needs of other riparian countries including Ethiopia which is the largest supplier of Nile flows, accounting for 70-80% of Nile waters. Apart from Sudan and Egypt, none of the other Nile basin countries have declared to accede to the treaties and they are not legally bound to uphold the treaties as they are not in favour of either Egypt or Sudan. Ethiopia, for example, wants to abrogate these treaties on the grounds that they are invalid because they do not recognise Ethiopia's rights or voice over the Nile. When the above treaties were signed, many African countries were still under European colonial rule and now things have changed. Nine other riparian states, including South Sudan which is now an independent state, argued that the past treaties between Egypt and Britain and the treaty between Egypt and Sudan are no longer valid, and they are not legally bound to abide by the existing treaties as they were not involved in the process of making them. Other riparian states stated that the 1929 and 1959 treaties only considered the interests of Egypt and Sudan, completely ignoring the other riparian states.

As another example, Julius Nyerere as the new leader of Tanzania shortly after achieving independence in 1961, considered that past agreements placed his country's development projects under the control of Cairo and that this was not suitable for an independent and sovereign Tanzania. The argument was that the country was now equal to Egypt as it was independent and sovereign and therefore should have the same rights to the Nile waters as Egypt. Tanzania called both the 1929 and 1959 treaties illegal. On the other

⁸ Yacob Arsano. (2007) *Ethiopia and the Nile: Dilemmas of National and Regional Hydropolitics*. University of Zurich. Available at: <https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/4534/eth-489-01.pdf?sequence=1>

hand, Kenya's parliament in 2003 stated that Kenya would have no legal obligation to comply with the 1929 treaty because Kenya was not consulted before signing the treaty. The parliament argued that the colonial treaty had restricted the Kenyan Government from using water resources to improve its living conditions.

In 1957, Ethiopia declared that it would unilaterally develop the Nile's water resources in its own country. They claimed that they would honour international principles of equitable distribution and not disadvantage other riparians but that they should also have a say in projects built in downstream countries. Previously, Ethiopia and other countries had poor economies and unstable politics, they did not have enough capital to invest in large projects and due to their unstable political conditions, they could not attract foreign investors. In general, they were not in a position to build big projects so that Egypt could still enjoy its share of the Nile. But now the situation has changed.

Former President of Egypt (2013-2014), Mohammed Morsi threatened war with Ethiopia. He said that the lives of the Egyptian people are connected around the Nile River. Mohammed Morsi equated the issue of reducing the Nile for Egypt as a matter of life and death. Previously, Anwar Sadat as the President of Egypt in the 1980s had also issued a similar threat. He stated that if Ethiopia took any action to block Egypt's right to the waters of the Nile, then there would be no other alternative for them but to use the might of its army. According to him, undermining a country's rights to water is undermining its life, and the decision to go to war on this value is indisputable in the international community. In addition, he stated that any action that would jeopardise the waters of the Blue Nile would be faced with a strong reaction from the Egyptian side, even if that action should lead to war. He believes that after signing the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel in 1979, there is no other issue that could bring Egypt into war except the water issue.

Based on the above, conflicts on the Nile River are caused by competing for limited resources at the same time. Although water is a renewable natural resource in the hydrological cycle, the increasing demand for water use in the Nile and climate change have made its abundance uncertain and could threaten the survival of countries that depend on it. In addition, the perceived unfair distribution of the Nile and exclusion from previous treaties has discouraged newly independent states from following suit and moving to

develop the Nile's potential according to their own interests, which can lead to conflict with neighbouring countries. Co-operation involving all interested countries and fair sharing to avoid conflict is needed to resolve this conflict.

3. Forms of Conflict Resolution in the Nile Basin Initiative

The existing pattern of cooperation on Nile issues is characterised by bilateralism, an exclusive focus on technical issues, and the absence of involvement from other riparian states. The NBI or Nile Basin Initiative can be said to be a breakthrough to change the status of competition among riparian states into co-operation. In contrast to the entrenched pattern of nearly half a century, the NBI was born to herald a new era that manifested a remarkable change in the pattern and substance of state-to-state relations along the Nile River. The NBI was officially launched in February 1999 in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania as an 'inclusive transitional mechanism for co-operation until a permanent co-operation framework is established'. The NBI has a shared vision of achieving sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilisation of the Nile Basin's water resources⁹.

The NBI is not the first initiative in the Nile Basin, there have been previous attempts to establish co-operation platforms. An example is Undugu between 1983 and 1992, which means 'brotherhood'. Undugu aimed to establish the Nile Basin Economic Community and the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of Development and Environmental Protection of the Basin (TECCONILE). The main focus of TECCONILE is technical cooperation on environment and water quality. However, none of the previous initiatives included all the riparian countries and so they could not offer a comprehensive institutional arrangement with a common vision for benefit sharing. The lack of significant progress among the Nile riparian countries eventually led the member countries, supported by the World Bank, to agree to establish the NBI to address this issue. The NBI members are Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Eritrea participates as an observer as it has limited interest and stake in the Nile¹⁰.

⁹ Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen. (2010) 'The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a "Water Security" Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?', *European Journal of International Law*, 21(2), pp. 421–440. doi: 10.1093/ejil/chq027.

¹⁰ Hanne Knaepen & Bruce Byiers. (2017) *Understanding the Nile Basin Initiative Balancing historical rights, national needs and regional interests*. Available at: <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/NBI-Background-Paper-PEDRO-Political-Economy-Dynamics-Regional-Organisations-Africa-ECDPM-2017.pdf> (Accessed: 21 November 2023).

Nile riparian countries have different interests or concerns from Nile basin cooperation. The NBI programme articulates a shared vision consisting of a limited number of activities that are effective in creating a coordination mechanism among its member countries. The main activities are economic and sectoral analyses, stakeholder engagement, and so on. In addition, Egypt and Ethiopia should create a water resources policy that promotes harmonisation of policies and laws on the use, development, protection, conservation, and management of transboundary or shared water and related resources. They should also develop a water protocol for the implementation of this policy. This policy should address the issues that arise as a result of the sharing of the Nile River between countries with different social and economic conditions. In addition, a different pattern of approach is also needed so that it is not only coordinated for the management of water resources for two state parties only.

4. International Regulation on International River Water Use

In addition to the many bilateral and multilateral agreements entered by countries around the Nile, there are international regulations governing the use of river water. The Helsinki Rules for the use of international river waters describe some of the factors relevant for the reasonable and equitable sharing of water. The relevant factors examined in this section are the geography of the basin (including the drainage area of each basin country) and the hydrology of the basin (including the contribution of water by each basin country). In the case of the Nile River, the first criterion for the allocation of water resources to riparian countries is their share in the Nile basin area. According to this rule, Sudan controls the largest area of the Nile basin and its share of the river is followed by Ethiopia, Egypt, and Uganda.

5. GERD: Political-Economic Opportunities for Ethiopia and Challenges for Egypt

As explained earlier, for Egypt, the Nile River has become a support for the country's national interests, especially in the economic aspect. Egypt has monopolised the Nile River with a number of legitimacies in the form of treaties and agreements since 1929¹¹. This shows that Egypt has made the Nile River the backbone for the sustainability of its

¹¹John Mukum Mbaku. (2020) *The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, The Brookings Institution*. Available at: <https://www.me-policy.org/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/> (Accessed: 26 February 2024).

country, almost the entire population of Egypt is on the banks of the Nile. Likewise, wheat farming, which is the staple food of the Egyptian people, was developed based on the flow of the Nile River. Ethiopia, as an upstream inhabitant of the Nile, does not recognise the agreement that governs the sharing of the river's water resources. Meanwhile, for Ethiopia, the Nile is used to power the electricity centre. With Ethiopia's booming economy that has brought massive foreign investment since the 2010s, this has resulted in a sharp rise in electricity consumption in Ethiopia, coupled with Ethiopia's population as the second largest country in Africa.

Construction of the GERD (*Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*) began in 2011. The construction of the GERD would threaten the existing water allocation of the Nile River. The project is Ethiopia's largest development project and is expected to boost the economy and alleviate poverty for the Ethiopian people. GERD is one of Ethiopia's mega projects on the Nile River that started in 2011. This power plant is one of the largest in Africa capable of lighting more than two million households in the western part of Ethiopia with an energy capacity of up to 6,000 Megawatts¹². Economically, this surplus electricity supply has the potential to be used by Ethiopia to export electricity to neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya. On the political aspect, it certainly gives Ethiopia status as a regional hegemon in East Africa and enhances Ethiopia's ability as a strong state in the region¹³. In addition, for Ethiopia, the GERD provides the foundation for the development of industrial parks in the western region of the country. The power generated can increase opportunities for the establishment of new centres of economic growth in areas such as Benishangul-Gumuz State, Gambela, and the Southern Region. It could also encourage the diversification of Ethiopia's economy which has been dependent on agricultural sectors such as coffee, livestock products and vegetables. For Egypt, this project could dominate Ethiopia's control over the Nile as an upstream country, threatening Egypt's future survival¹⁴. The water supply of the Nile River to several major cities in

¹² The Economist (2020) *The bitter dispute over Africa's largest dam*, www.economist.com. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/07/04/the-bitter-dispute-over-africas-largest-dam> (Accessed: 6 April 2024).

¹³ Mehari Beyene. (2017) *How efficient is The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam?*, www.internationalrivers.org. Available at: <https://archive.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/ethiopiadamefficiency.pdf> (Accessed: 24 March 2024).

¹⁴ Ashok Swain. (2020) *Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Catalyst for basin-wide water cooperation?*, www.theafricareport.com. Available at: <https://www.theafricareport.com/35797/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam->

Egypt could certainly be reduced. So far, the Nile flows into the Aswan Dam, which is Egypt's national irrigation centre. The climate crisis that brings El Niño drought and desertification continues to threaten the country¹⁵.

In February 2015 Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia reached a preliminary agreement on the GERD. This agreement was an important step towards strengthening bilateral relations between Egypt and Ethiopia¹⁶. Ethiopia started building the GERD in 2011. However, this brought new concerns. Cairo expressed concern over the impact on the 55.5 billion cubic metres that the GERD could cause. Since then, negotiations between the three countries were put on hold for three years. However, talks resumed in 2014 and the Declaration of Principles of Dam Renaissance in Khartoum addressing dam management with written assurances was signed. According to the charter, the dam's reservoir cannot be filled without the consent of both Egypt and Sudan. The charter was signed in Khartoum in 2015. The dam is of social and political importance to Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, given its enormous hydroelectric power generation that is expected to help address the country's electricity shortage, and consequently impact the education and health sectors. Moreover, the completion of such a mammoth project is considered a great political leverage for the Ethiopian people. Later in February 2019, the three leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia met to ensure their commitment not to jeopardise the interests of their countries while reaching consensus on the technical issues of the GERD¹⁷.

C. Conclusion

This paper finds that the Nile River still holds the potential for conflict between countries in its utilisation. The Nile River has strategic value in terms of geopolitics and geoeconomics. In the geopolitical context, the Nile River is of strategic value to Ethiopia because it can influence the countries affected by the development of the GERD. Likewise

catalyst-for-basin-wide-water-cooperation/ (Accessed: 16 March 2024).

¹⁵ Mervyn Piesse. (2019) *The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Power for Ethiopia, Disaster for Egypt?*, www.hidropolitikakademi.org. Available at: <https://www.hidropolitikakademi.org/en/news/26414/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-power-for-ethiopia-disaster-for-egypt> (Accessed: 22 January 2024).

¹⁶ Joel Okundi Obengo. (2016) 'Hydropolitics of the Nile: The case of Ethiopia and Egypt', *African Security Review*, 25(1), pp. 95–103. doi: 10.1080/10246029.2015.1126527.

¹⁷ Nourhan Magdi & Samar Samir. (2019) 'Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia reiterate commitment to no harm trilateral interests', www.egypttoday.com. Available at: <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/64485/Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia-reiterate-commitment-to-no-harm-trilateral-interests>.

for Egypt, as part of strategic national interests in various fields. In the geoeconomic context, the Nile River shapes the economic aspects of the countries it passes through, especially for Egypt and Ethiopia. The strategic aspect of the Nile River can bring potential for the development of trade and investment in both countries. This strategic aspect has brought conflict to both countries. The conflict started during the British colonial period where the treaties made at that time later on gave problems to the independent country. Despite bilateral and multilateral agreements, potential conflicts may still arise in the future. Therefore, there is a need for co-operation between the two parties and the drafting of new treaties to address this issue. In addition, it is important to strengthen the political commitment of the conflicting parties to jointly stop the conflict and promote the joint utilisation of the Nile River that is more beneficial to both parties.

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